Abstract

Abstract

This paper proposes and develops a new model for understanding how institutional justice affects sustainable economic development. Conventional economics emphasizes budget size, whereas the proposed model emphasizes the justice score. This is because budget effectiveness is based on a “justice score” that ranges from 0 to 1. By comparing Denmark and Bangladesh, I show how a lack of justice reduces the effectiveness of government spending. The study also explains how anti-corruption measures and social protection can increase economic stability. Despite constant GDP growth, Bangladesh’s development score is limited to 33.08% due to a deficit in institutional justice. However, Denmark has achieved a sustainable development score of 78.35% with the same resources. This model seeks to demonstrate that a justice score below 50% signals a heightened risk of political instability and authoritarian rule. The presence of a dictator indicates a low level of justice, and the model also predicts it even when justice is low. An attempt has been made to demonstrate that justice serves as a moral factor in the economic system by mathematically analyzing the GDP growth rates of different countries and the average value of justice. This study concludes that justice is an economic multiplier, arguing that policymakers should prioritize institutional fairness and equitable resource distribution over capital accumulation alone to ensure long-term socio-economic sustainability and political stability.